最近有個男大生好心幫母親送貨，父親過世不久，他不忍母親一人操持家務，明明自己燒烤店打工很累，下班後緊接又幫母親送貨，凌晨五點疲勞駕駛，不小心偏離車道就撞車。撞到的竟是法拉利，法拉利的前面還是法拉利，一連四台法拉利，像在打保齡球一樣sprite! 一次讓他撞個夠。
這個新聞第一時間引起大家注意，媒體主動為他冠上孝子，網友也紛紛站上他的位置幫他算要賠多少？並自動將這件事的主角，分成有錢人、沒錢人；沒錢人很可憐，捐款紛紛湧上；有錢人很囂張，車主的車已經受到傷害，居然還被肉搜。(醫美的醫生，難怪)
人間最美的風景是愛心，但傾斜的愛心與同情心讓人哭笑不得。
而我第一個感覺是『真得是……….不小心的嗎？』
大概十年前吧，有次跟兩三位同事在一家餐廳點咖啡聊天，大概晚上九點快十點。我點的咖啡，服務生端來時，卻不小心潑落，而且哪裡不好潑，正潑到我大腿內側。我沒有生氣，當時沒有，現在也沒有；只是蠻窘的。
內心有種怪怪的感覺，端咖啡，潑灑咖啡，在所難免，任何人都會；但哪裡不好潑灑，偏會潑灑到我大腿內側？那是怎樣的正中標的，『不小心當中的蓄意』。雖然我沒有生氣，我仍感覺到是衝著我而來，雖然服務生跟我都是陌生人，但冥冥之中，我有些東西惹到他不爽，那個不爽，我不知道是甚麼，他可能也不自知。對我那是個無妄之災。老闆娘帶我到洗手間冰敷時一直抱歉，說他半工半讀這幾天要考試了，可能累了或怎樣就失手，服務生也很低姿態道歉。
回過頭來看這新聞，某種程度，第一時間我仍會覺得是種『不小心的蓄意』，真正的狀況只有這個男孩子心裡知道，天知/地知/他自己心裡知。
或許他內心覺得很幹，為什麼他們家那麼衰，別人家隨便就有法拉利？為什麼他要累成這樣，別人都可以怎樣？一方面也真得是累，就撞上。但倒果為因，可以解釋成無奈的疲倦，萬般的不小心。電視上打馬賽克的臉，你可以看到他穿耳洞，有雙憤怒鳥的眉毛。我沒有要說什麼，但感覺不是個溫柔氣順的年輕人。
其實你往深處想，這世上沒有巧合，只有鳳飛飛唱的巧合。嚴格說起來，沒有不巧剛好撞到法拉利這件事~ 雖然看起來是。
於是也想到一篇文章『反對同情』，裏頭提到，映照出另一個人的痛苦並不是善良的主要來源，這樣的同情心導致一個人跳下去救溺水的孩子，或捐錢給慈善機構。事實上，可能造成額外的個人痛苦，只會增加人類整體的悲慘。
『反對同情』不代表作者否定人性這項美德，而是如果同情不能讓世界變得更美好，那我們可能要坐下來，好好想想大家的同情出了什麼問題？他提出一個健康的同情配方，是【理性、仁慈、與自我控制】
不過，不管同情心不同情心，現在捐款紛紛湧入，也稍稍紓解男大生與他母親的現實壓力。唉，最終錢才是這世上最美的風景啦〜補充，整形診所法拉利車主說，我不是富二代，錢也是辛苦賺來的。(OS: 每個人的玩具不一樣，只不過我的玩具是法拉利，這樣有錯嗎？) 男大生要撞跑車，應該去杜拜撞警務跑車(警車)看看。
講那麼多到底在幫誰？總算都平安就是好事啦，人內心的世界還是要好好面對，外人的同情心則不必過度氾濫，就是這樣。
圖: 網路~ 杜拜法拉利警車
相關報導
相關報導 https://udn.com/news/story/7320/3540491
好文推薦 "反對同情"原文 https://www.theguardian.com/…/against-empathy-paul-bloom-th…
後記: 有一個想法，我一直還沒想清楚。....是我看這新聞的整個基調感覺。
一般開車的人，撞到超跑的機率有多高?
又，如果路邊停的是砂石車，水泥車，大卡車，他還撞得上去嗎？
我在想一個"撞超跑情結"。
第一個問題有答案，孤狗一下，現在買得起超跑的，不在少數; 加上可以用租的，所以，撞超跑的機率比中樂透還高。這終歸屬於社會上少數人的玩具，牽拖大多數一般人真得不好。既然要玩奢侈玩具，確實需要付出相對高額的方式。立法諸公可能需立個法來保障其他更多人的權益
我寫這篇試圖在理清楚，是否有種撞超跑情結，蓄意的不小心，不是故意的故意。
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#反對同情 原作者保羅布魯姆
同理心是道德的基石嗎？ 兩項新的研究顯示，它的含義以及它在創造一個更加關愛的社會的有用性是很含混的。
當人們問心理學教授保羅布魯姆，他在從事什麼新的研究時，他回答『同情心』，但補充說他『反對同情心』。他發現，這就像『反對小貓』一樣古怪，好像在開玩笑。這段話為他的最新著作【反對同情】設下一個基調。理性的同理變成刻意特立獨行的作品－苦澀，挑釁，經常機智，毫不掩飾反對一種過度的文化，吹捧同理心的美德，亞馬遜書店至少有1,500本書都以同情心做標題。
布魯姆論點的基礎是，細膩的情感，有如精緻的話語，奶油沒有歐洲防風草(一種香草)。感受到你的痛苦很好，但不一定能激發出最好的道德回應。事實上，他認為，能直覺感受他人的感受助長一些含混不清的道德行為。同情指數的低分通常被認為是精神失調的特徵，但很多精神病患能感受他人的感受，這是為什麼他們很折磨人。
布魯姆引用奧威爾在1984年所著布萊恩的性格，他能分辨他受害者的回應是相當精緻的：「你害怕，」布萊恩看著他的臉說，「在另一刻，某樣東西要斷裂。 你特別的恐懼在你的背骨。你心裡有個生動的畫面，脊椎骨啪地~斷開，脊髓液滴出來。這就是你在想的，對吧，溫斯頓？」透過這樣的機制，布萊恩把溫斯頓最大的恐懼牽引出來（一種他自己從未說出的恐懼），老鼠，部署它要摧毀他。
應該說，布魯姆並不認同冷漠的無情。實際上，他反對同情的尖銳立場，只是想鼓勵我們，對於我們跟自身道德標準的關係想得更精準，更有效。他把自己的顏色精準釘在理性同理而非同情，是這本書想要探討的中心思想。我認為是正確的，人們對這兩個詞存在著混淆。
映照出另一個人的痛苦並不是善良的主要來源，布魯姆說，善良是一種他很認同的品質，但這個善良不是同情心，他說，這導致一個人跳下去救溺水的孩子，或捐錢給慈善機構。事實上，對另一個人危險處境的氾濫同情可能導致癱瘓和無所幫助，或造成額外的個人痛苦，只會增加人類整體的悲慘。
更糟的是，『出於同情的愛心通常有不良效果』。在這部分，他對育兒問題很感興趣，指出『好的養育方式可能給孩子短暫的痛苦』。過度認同一個孩子的不快樂可能會導致父母和孩子都無能。（一時的痛苦換來長期的好處，比方：寒泳或坐在牙醫診療椅上）。他指出，如果一位醫生感受到他病患的痛苦，想像一下一個外科醫生同情癌症病人，當他割除腫瘤的過程。
布魯姆試圖強調在政治與社會政策的理性客觀，同情而來所做的決策的危險性，因為『數不清，帶有偏頗』。他認為，同情會窄化我們看自己的方式，有持續的證據顯示，我們對那些跟自己有若干類似的，或比較有吸引力的，會產生同情。從阿勒坡救出的五歲兒童Omran Daqneesh的照片引發廣泛的同情，但這是否能激發我們援助跟Omran有同樣的遭遇未知的其他公民。
布魯姆的大部分論點基於功利主義，關乎資源的有效分配，勝過單一關注的溫暖光芒。很多好的論調反對功利主義，但這本書提出不同的觀點。很多研究指出小小孩以同情心回應事情的能力，但小孩似乎感受到的不是出自太多同情。當他們感受到某人心情不好，小孩會輕拍，撫摸，擁抱或遞出玩具給另一個小孩或大人。但很少是自己也心情不好的情況下。這讓我想到，錯信了同情的整個概念，怎樣才算真正“知道”另一個人的真實感受？ 完美可服務的“同情”這個字有什麼不對？
一種充滿同情的理解，只是想像力的嘗試，不知道他人存在的特殊性，想去感受他人的一切。相信一個同情反應的有效性，是一種一廂情願，以為我們基本上了解他人 – 但我們不了解。我們也不需要。我們的差異應該得到尊重，多樣性讓我們有趣。布魯姆並沒有申論到那麼遠，但他相信，與其情感上認同，到不如更應該培養往後站一步，提供更理性有效的關懷方式的能力。
這不是彼得分享的觀點，他的書“同情本能：如何創造更文明的社會走更長的路”加深布魯姆認為對於同情有種基本的混淆。如果我們用“同理”去代替“同情”，就比較能得到共識。
我與布魯姆站一起：這無疑的是分有價值的禮物，但前提是要有理性的道德立場，以及適當判斷後的行動。有很多具爭議性的道德行為與同情無關。付稅，或撿垃圾並不有魅力，但它們源自於對於眾人之善的理性認知。
身為活躍的藝術委員會主席，Bazalgette的書同情在藝術上有最強的角色，如果同情真地起作用。身為科幻小說家，我會說我對我創造出的角色，就想像的概念而言，沒那麼具同情心，包括準備把他們丟到獅子嘴裡，如果那是他們的命運的話。
Against Empathy by Paul Bloom;
The Empathy Instinct by Peter Bazalgette – review
Is empathy the bedrock of morality? Two new studies suggest there is confusion around its meaning – and its usefulness in creating a more caring society
When people asked psychology professor Paul Bloom what new project he was working on, he would reply “empathy” – adding the rider that he was “against” it. This, he was to discover, was like “being against kittens, a view considered so outlandish that it can’t be serious”. The remark sets the tone for his latest book. Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion is a deliberately maverick work – astringent, provocative, often witty and unabashedly against a prevailing culture that places so high a premium on the virtue of empathy that at least 1,500 books available through Amazon apparently have a version of the word in their title.
The basis of Bloom’s argument is that fine feelings, like fine words, butter no parsnips. Feeling your pain is all well and good but not necessarily the best trigger of an effective moral response. Indeed, he argues that an ability to intuit another’s feelings might well be an aid to some dubious moral behaviour. A low score on the empathy index is commonly believed to be a feature of psychopathy, but many psychopaths are supremely able to feel as others feel, which is why they make good torturers.
Bloom cites the character of O’Brien in Orwell’s 1984, whose capacity to discern his victim’s responses is exquisitely refined: “‘You are afraid,’ said O’Brien, watching his face, ‘that in another moment something is going to break. Your especial fear is that it will be your backbone. You have a vivid mental picture of the vertebrae snapping apart and the spinal fluid dripping out of them. That is what you are thinking, is it not, Winston?’” It is through this facility that O’Brien can divine Winston Smith’s greatest dread (a fear he himself has never articulated), rats, and deploy it to destroy him.
Bloom, it should be said, is not in favour of an indifferent heartlessness. Indeed, his trenchant stand against empathy is an attempt to encourage us to think more accurately and more effectively about our relationship to our moral terms. He pins his colours to the mast of rational compassion rather than empathy, and it is a central tenet of the book’s argument – I think a correct one – that there exists a confusion in people’s minds about the meaning of the two terms.
The mirroring of another’s anguish is not, Bloom would claim, the principal source of kindness, a quality that he is supremely in favour of. It is not empathy, he argues, that leads one to spring to the rescue of a drowning child or necessarily give to charity. Indeed, an over-identified response to another’s parlous situation could well lead to paralysis and inaction or, in causing an additional personal distress, only add to the general sum of human woe.
Worse still, “kindness motivated by empathy often has bad effects”. On that note he is interesting on the subject of parenting, pointing out that “good parenting involves coping with the short-term suffering of your child”. An over-identification with one’s child’s unhappiness can be disabling to both parent and child (it might be a longer-term benefit to your child to bear for a time the nasty cold of the swimming bath or the dentist’s chair). He points out that a doctor who felt their patient’s pain would be unlikely to be able to do their job – picture a surgeon empathising with your cancer as she cuts out your tumour. Nor, a rather different point, is empathy what we necessarily want. I recall the indignation I felt when having had my wallet stolen I was subjected to a “victim’s visit” from the local crime unit – a patronising and irritating substitute, I felt, for anyone actually tracking down my lost credit cards.
Bloom is especially vocal on the need for a rational objectivity in political and social policy and the dangers attendant on decisions prompted by empathy because it is “innumerate and biased”. Empathy, he suggests, narrows our focus in a self-regarding way – there is sustained evidence that we empathise more with those that either resemble us or those we find attractive. The picture of five-year-old Omran Daqneesh, pulled from the rubble in Aleppo, prompted widespread breast-beating, but Bloom would be sceptical of this having much effect on our willingness to give aid to Omran’s equally affected – but unknown – fellow citizens.
Much of Bloom’s argument is based on utilitarian principles where the effective allocation of resources trumps the warm glow of a more singular and intimate concern. There are many good arguments against utilitarianism, but the book for me raised a different question. There has been much research into the seeming capacity of small children to respond empathetically, but what children appear to feel is not so much empathy, when they perceive someone in distress, as sympathy. Typically, children will pat, touch, hug or offer a toy to another child or adult in distress but only rarely in this situation show signs of anguish themselves. This brings me to my own particular beef, which is to mistrust the validity of the whole concept of empathy. How can we really claim to “know” what another truly feels? And what was wrong with the perfectly serviceable word “sympathy”?
A sympathetic understanding is an imaginative attempt to sense another’s otherness without purporting to appropriate or own their existential uniqueness. The belief in a valid empathetic response suggests to me a form of wishful thinking that we are fundamentally knowable to one another – which we are not. Nor should we need to be. Our differences are to be respected and are what make us interesting. Bloom doesn’t go as far as this, but believes that rather than claiming emotional identification we should be cultivating our ability to stand back in order to provide a more rationally effective programme of care.
This is not a view shared by Peter Bazalgette, whose book The Empathy Instinct: How to Create a More Civil Society goes a long way to validate Bloom’s belief that there is a fundamental muddle about what empathy means. For if one were to substitute “compassion” or “sympathy” here for “empathy” there would be little to disagree with. Where Bazalgette does differ from Bloom is in perceiving the capacity to put oneself in another’s shoes as the sine qua non of morality.
I am staunchly with Bloom here: it is undoubtedly a valuable gift, but only provided it is fortified by a prior rational moral position and appropriately judged action. And there are many arguably moral actions that have nothing to do with empathy or even sympathy – paying one’s taxes, or picking up litter are not glamorous activities but they stem from a rational perception of what is for the general good.
As the outgoing head of the Arts Council, Bazalgette’s book is at its strongest on the role of empathy in the arts, if empathy is what is really at work. As a writer of fiction I would suggest that what I feel for my characters is not so much empathy as an imaginative conception, which includes a readiness to toss them to the lions if that is what the arc of their fate dictates.
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